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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker rendered
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) advisory and
directed appellate courts to use a “reasonableness” standard of review
when considering criminal sentences.1 The question remained,
however, of the relationship between the sentencing ranges provided
by the Guidelines and a “reasonable” sentence.
The Seventh Circuit has chosen to grant sentences falling within
the range proscribed by the Guidelines a presumption of
reasonableness on appellate review.2 This approach is flawed for two
reasons: first, the presumption of reasonableness is not supported by
the Supreme Court’s remedial opinion in Booker and second, the court
cannot find support for the presumption in the plain meaning of 18
U.S.C.A. 3553. Recent cases have highlighted both the flaws in the

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2
United States v. Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005).
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court’s rationales in developing the presumption, as well as a
surprising inconsistency in the court’s application of the presumption.
The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari for the
question of whether Booker’s holding can be harmonized with granting
a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence falling within the
Guidelines. Because the Seventh Circuit has played a notable role in
the history of the Guidelines, and because the Circuit’s handling of the
Guidelines post-Booker has been particularly influential, the Seventh
Circuit’s approaches and rationales for the presumption are likely to be
featured prominently in the Supreme Court’s upcoming decision.
I. BACKGROUND
The Road to Booker
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence. U.S. CONST. amend. VI
For decades, the potential conflict between judicial fact-finding in
criminal sentencing and the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement has
arisen when defendants’ sentences were affected by factors neither
admitted nor found by a jury.3 As state and federal statutes have
increasingly sought to emphasize the virtues of uniformity and
predictability, the concern that the role of the jury was being usurped
by mechanical judicial determinations increased as well. The last
seven years have seen the Supreme Court clarify the Sixth

3

See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
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Amendment’s requirements, and in doing so, have set the stage for the
current status of the Guidelines.4
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court considered a sentence given
to a defendant convicted of possession of a firearm for unlawful
purpose and unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon.5 The
sentencing judge determined that the defendant, who had fired shots
into the home of an African American family, was eligible for an
extended term of incarceration under New Jersey’s hate crime statute,
and sentenced him to twelve years. The Court, in an opinion written
by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg, held that the defendant’s increased sentence violated the
Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement. Because the hate crime
enhancement increased the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory
maximum for the crimes to which the defendant had pled guilty, the
Sixth Amendment required that it “must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”6 Although the holding was
limited to situations in which an enhancement resulted in the sentence
exceeding the statutory maximum, the Court endorsed the more broad
rule that “[i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the
jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.”7
Four years later the Court was faced with a similar situation in
Blakely v. Washington, in which it considered a sentence given to a
defendant convicted of second-degree kidnapping involving domestic
violence and the use of a firearm.8 The sentencing judge found that
the defendant had acted with deliberate cruelty, and imposed a
sentence of ninety months, more than three years above the statutory

4

See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2004).
5
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6
Id. at 490.
7
Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
8
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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maximum without the enhancement.9 In an opinion written by Justice
Scalia and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg,
the Court held that because the facts supporting the defendant’s
additional sentence were neither found beyond a reasonable doubt by a
jury, nor admitted by the defendant, the sentence violated his Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury.10 Despite the fact that the sentence
in Blakely was below the statutory maximum, the Court nevertheless
stated that the issue was controlled by the rule expressed in Apprendi11
Justice Scalia clarified that “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not
the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional
facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional
findings.”12
Although the Court was willing to extend Apprendi’s rule to
encompass any fact that increased a defendant’s punishment above
what could have been given in its absence, it was not yet ready to
consider the mandatory Guidelines.13 Even though the Guidelines
required sentencing judges to make findings of fact that could
substantially increase a defendant’s sentence, Justice Scalia made clear
that “[t]he Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no
opinion on them.”14
II. UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
Freddie Booker was convicted for possessing with the intent to
distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base.15 Upon sentencing, the
district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant had distributed several hundred grams more than the 92.5

9

Id.
Id. at 303-04.
11
Id. at 301.
12
Id. at 303-04.
13
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 227, 305 n.9 (2004).
14
Id.
15
United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 509 (7th Cir. 2004)
10
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grams found by the jury.16 The defendant was eligible for a range of
thirty years to life in prison under the mandatory Guidelines, and was
sentenced to the bottom of the range.17 Judge Posner, writing for the
Seventh Circuit, considered the mandatory nature of the Guidelines to
be determinative.18 The “difference between allowing a sentencing
judge to consider a range of factors that may include facts that he
informally finds…and commanding him to make fact-finding and base
the sentence (within a narrow band) on them” was, for the court, the
difference between a constitutional and unconstitutional sentencing
scheme.19
Judge Posner was unwilling to allow the consistency of the
Guidelines to outweigh their constitutional flaws.20 While it was
“tempting to think that maybe the guidelines can be saved by
imagining the Sentencing Commission as a kind of super-judge who
elaborates a code of sentencing principles much a thoughtful real
judge, operating in a regime of indeterminate sentencing, might do
informally in an effort to try to make his sentences consistent[,]” the
importance of the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement under Blakely
could not be ignored.21
A. Justice Breyer’s Remedial Opinion
That is why we think it fair . . . to assume judicial
familiarity with a “reasonableness” standard. And that
is why we believe that appellate judges will prove
capable of facing with greater equanimity than would
Justice Scalia what he calls the “daunting prospect” of
applying such a standard across the board. United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262-63 (2005).
16

Id.
Id.
18
Id. at 512.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
17
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In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court continued the
reasoning of Apprendi and Blakely and found that the Sixth
Amendment’s jury requirement prohibited mandatory judicial factfinding that determined a defendant’s sentence absent specific jury
findings.22 The opinion, while seemingly a logical continuation of
Apprendi and Blakely, was notable for the bifurcated majorities
responsible for the Court’s constitutional and remedial opinions.23
First, a majority comprised of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, and Ginsburg, held that the Guidelines were
unconstitutional.24 Next, a majority made up of Justices Breyer,
O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Rehnquist fashioned
the remedy.25
Writing for the majority in the constitutional opinion, Justice
Stevens noted that Sixth Amendment rights “are implicated whenever
a judge seeks to impose a sentence that is not solely based on facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”26 In short,
the Guidelines were unconstitutional so long judges were required to
act in the role traditionally reserved for juries.27
Although the mandatory nature of the Guidelines was
unconstitutional, the question remained of how exactly to fix them.28
Writing for a separate remedial majority, Justice Breyer adopted an
approach neither party had sought and determined that the Guidelines
could be salvaged if the portions making them mandatory were
severed from the rest of the statute.29 First, § 3553(b)(1) was severed
to remove the provision that required sentencing courts to impose a
sentence within the Guidelines range, which transformed them from
22

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Id. at 226, 244.
24
Id. at 226-27.
25
Id. at 246.
26
Id. at 232.
27
Id. at 231-33.
28
Id. at 245.
29
Id.
23
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mandatory to “effectively advisory.”30 Second, and most importantly
for this note, the Court severed §3742(e), which set forth the
mandatory de novo review appellate courts used for any departures
from the Guidelines.31
Justice Breyer acknowledged that excising § 3742(e) left the
Guidelines with no clear standard of appellate review, but quickly
dismissed concerns that appellate courts would be unable to function
without a statutory standard.32 Even in the absence of explicit statutory
language, Justice Breyer wrote, courts can infer review standards from
related statutory language, the structure of the statute, and the sound
administration of justice.33 Justice Breyer noted that the appellate
courts were not without experience applying a reasonableness standard
to criminal sentences.34 Prior to 2003, the Guidelines had specifically
directed the appellate courts to use a type of reasonableness analysis
when reviewing sentences falling outside the proscribed Guidelines
range.35 Additionally, the text of the Guidelines had “long required
their use in important sentencing circumstances—both on review of
departures . . . and on review of sentences imposed where there was no
applicable Guideline . . .”36
The standard for the Guidelines was now clear, at least to
Justice Breyer: “The district courts, while not bound to apply the
Guidelines, must consult those guidelines and take them into account
when sentencing . . . The courts of appeals review sentencing
decisions for unreasonableness.”37

30

Id. at 259.
Id.
32
Id. at 259-60.
33
Id. at 260-61.
34
Id. at 261.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 262.
37
Id. at 264.
31
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B. Justice Scalia’s Dissent
What I anticipate will happen is that ‘unreasonableness’
review will produce a discordant symphony of different
standards, varying from court to court…38
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Booker expressed skepticism about
both the legal reasoning behind the remedial opinion and about the
practical effect of the “reasonableness” standard of review for the
appellate courts.39 He noted that contrary to the Justice Breyer’s
assurance that appellate courts had sufficient experience applying a
reasonableness standard or review, such a standard was in actually in
contrast to the bulk accepted practice of appellate sentencing review.40
In Justice Scalia’s opinion, applying a standard of review to the
entirety of sentencing appeals that had previously only applied to
16.7% of cases was a recipe for uncertainty.41
Justice Scalia summed up his apprehension about an uncertain
future in the closing lines of his dissent.42 He wondered,
Will appellate review for ‘unreasonableness’ preserve
de facto mandatory Guidelines by discouraging district
court judges from sentencing outside Guidelines
ranges? Will it simply add another layer of unfettered
judicial discretion to the sentencing process? Or will it
be a mere formality, used by busy appellate judges only
to ensure that busy district court judges say all the right
things when they explain how they have exercised their
newly restored discretion? Time may tell, but today’s
remedial majority will not.43
38

Id. at 312 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 303-04.
40
Id. at 310-11.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 313.
43
Id.
39
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III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DEVELOPS A STANDARD OF
PRESUMPTIVE REASONABLENESS
The Seventh Circuit’s understanding of the post-Booker
reasonableness standard of review coalesced over the course of three
cases in mid 2005.44 The first two of these cases, United States v.
George and United States v. Dean, foreshadowed the court’s desire to
find a standard of review for Guideline sentences that respected
Booker’s remedial opinion.45 In the last of these cases, United States v.
Mykytiuk, the Seventh circuit expressly adopted for the first time a
presumption of reasonableness for any within-the-guidelines
sentence.46 In each of these cases, the court took pains to reiterate the
post-Booker advisory status of the Guidelines while simultaneously
developing a standard of review that elevated the Guidelines above the
other § 3553(a) factors.47
A. George and Dean Set the Stage
In George, the court hinted that although Booker made clear
that the Guidelines were advisory, the Seventh Circuit would
nevertheless still be willing to treat them with a respect not necessarily
afforded to the other sentencing factors in § 3553(a).48 The defendant
in George had pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy to defraud the
United States and was sentenced to 48 months imprisonment as well
as roughly $614,000 in restitution.49 The defendant argued that under
Booker’s interpretation, his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment’s
44

See United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Dean, 414 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606 (7th.
Cir. 2005).
45
George, 403 F.3d 470; Dean, 414 F.3d 725.
46
Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606.
47
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a); George, 403 F.3d 470; Dean, 414 F.3d 725;
Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606.
48
George, 403 F.3d at 472-73.
49
Id.
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jury requirement.50 In the opinion, Judge Easterbrook made clear that
the court would not expect a sentencing judge to “record all of the
considerations that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists; it [was] enough to
calculate the range accurately and explain why (if the sentence lies
outside it) this defendant deserves more or less.”51 The implication of
that statement was clear: the court would only require explanation
from a sentencing judge if the sentence imposed lay outside the
Guideline range.52 If a district court judge wished to avoid addressing
the factors in § 3553(a), he could continue to find safe harbor within
the Guidelines.53
Three months later in Dean, the court addressed more directly
the status that the Guidelines would be given in post-Booker
reasonableness review.54 In Dean, the defendant argued that the
sentencing judge placed undue emphasis on the range calculated by
the Guidelines and did not adequately consider the other factors in §
3553(a).55 Writing for the court, Judge Posner acknowledged that
sentencing judges are required to consider the relevant factors in §
3553(a) , even noting the sentencing factors’ “new vitality” in the
exercise of sentencing discretion.56
This apparent respect for the parity of sentencing factors was
immediately tempered, however, by what Judge Posner considered to
be the “practical objection[s]” to the defendant’s argument that the
sentencing judge should consider all the § 3553(a) factors equally.57
Despite the plain language of § 3553(a), the court was unwilling to
increase the workload of sentencing judges (and by extension,
appellate justices) by requiring them to consider these factors in every
50

Id. at 472.
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2005).
55
Id.
56
Id. (citing United States. v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th
Cir.2005)).
57
Dean, 414 F.3d at 729.
51
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case.58 In support of this reasoning, Judge Posner bemoaned the
“vague and, worse perhaps, hopelessly open-ended” nature of the
factors listed in § 3553(a).59 Showing a noteworthy disdain for the
statutory factors, Judge Posner pointed to the “interminable character
of inquiry into the meaning and application of each of the
‘philosophical’ concepts” in reaffirming George’s treatment of withinthe-guidelines sentences.60
Additionally, the court stated in Dean (without citation) that
Booker “requires the sentencing judge first to compute the guidelines
sentence just as he would have done before Booker, and then . . . to
decide whether the guidelines sentence is the correct sentence to give
the particular defendant.”61 This formula did not by itself bestow
presumptive reasonableness, but it did grant the Guidelines a
significant priority that is unsupported in Booker.62 By enshrining this
process as one “required” by Booker, the court embraced a formulaic
approach for the Guidelines while rejecting a formulaic approach
when addressing the factors listed in § 3553(a).63 The calculation of
the appropriate Guidelines sentence, of course, cannot be anything
other than formulaic; what is remarkable about the Seventh Circuit’s
approach is its use of that determination.64 After Dean, the Guidelines
remained not only the sole factor that must be taken into account in
each sentence, but the factor that must be taken into account prior to
the consideration of any others listed in § 3553(a).65

58

Id.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 727.
62
See id. at 729-30.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
59
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B. Mykytiuk elevates the Guidelines
The best way to express the new balance, in our view,
is to acknowledge that any sentence that is properly
calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.66
With this uncited declaration, the Seventh Circuit carried
George and Dean to their natural conclusions and effectively elevated
the Guidelines beyond a purely advisory status.67 Writing for the court,
Judge Wood framed the issue presented as a choice between two
extremes: the court could grant per se reasonableness to the Guidelines
at one extreme, or use “a clean slate that ignores the proper Guidelines
range” at the other.68 While acknowledging that the former standard
would obviously conflict with Booker’s constitutional analysis and the
latter would be inconsistent with Booker’s remedy, Judge Wood
attempted to strike a middle ground between these two extremes.69
Explaining how the court reached its conclusion, Judge Wood
pointed out that the Guidelines “represent at this point eighteen years’
worth of careful consideration of the proper sentence for federal
offenses.”70 It was natural to assume, therefore, that the Supreme
Court intended for the Guidelines to continue to play an important role
in sentencing.71 Many, or even most, sentences would and should
continue to fall within the applicable Guideline range.72 Accordingly,
the court concluded that a properly calculated Guidelines sentence was
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness at the appellate
level.73 “While we fully expect that it will be a rare Guidelines
66

United States v. Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id.
68
Id. at 607.
69
Id. at 607-08.
70
Id. at 607.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 608.
67
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sentence that is unreasonable,” judge Wood wrote, “the Court’s charge
that we measure each defendant’s sentence against the factors set forth
in § 3553 (a) requires the door to be left open for this possibility.”74
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH CANNOT FIND SUPPORT
IN BOOKER OR § 3553(A)
The court was careful in Mykytiuk to portray its decision as
merely granting the Guidelines the status to which they were
“entitled”.75 This deferential approach, however, does not find support
in Justice Breyer’s remedial Booker opinion or the relevant text of §
3553(a).76 The Seventh Circuit’s grant of presumptive reasonableness
to within-the-guidelines sentences is at best unsupported by Booker’s
remedial opinion, and in some respects contrary to the opinion.77
Nothing in the Supreme Court’s Booker opinion suggests that the
Court intended to grant the Guidelines preferential status in relation to
the other factors in § 3553(a).78 Justice Breyer noted in the remedial
opinion that the appropriate standard of appellate review could be
inferred from pre-2003 practice, where sentences falling outside the
applicable Guideline range were measured for reasonableness against
§ 3553(a) factors.79 Because § 3553(a) remained in effect after Booker,
the Court directed appellate courts to use those factors, as they have in
the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.80
Justice Breyer also pointed out that even without the mandatory
provisions of § 3553(b)(1), the Guidelines “continue[] to provide for
appeals from sentencing decisions (irrespective of whether the trial
judge sentences within or outside the Guidelines range in the exercise
74

Id.
Id.
76
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a);
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 et seq.
77
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
75
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of his discretionary power under § 3553(a)).”81 Had the remedial
majority intended to grant within-the-guidelines sentences a
presumption of reasonableness, or any preferential treatment, it seems
unlikely that they would have specified that sentences both within and
outside the Guidelines range should be measured for reasonableness
against § 3553(a) in this manner. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his
dissent, “[i]f the majority thought…the Guidelines not only had to be
‘considered’ (as the amputated statute requires) but generally to be
followed—its opinion would surely say so.”82 Instead, the remedial
opinion explicitly states that the “numerous factors” listed in § 3553(a)
“will guide appellate courts . . . in determining whether a sentence is
reasonable.”83
This lack of authority within Booker supporting a presumption
of reasonableness is reflected by the citations within the Mykytiuk
decision itself.84 Nowhere in the opinion does Judge Wood cite to a
specific portion of Booker that supports the presumption.85 Instead, the
portion of the opinion that expressly creates the presumption merely
points out that Booker requires the district courts to consult the
Guidelines and that the Sentencing Commission will continue to revise
the Guidelines in light of both district and appellate court
decisionmaking.86 Immediately following these two points, Judge
Wood states that the Guidelines are “entitled” to the rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness. 87
The Seventh Circuit’s grant of presumptive reasonableness to
within-the-Guidelines sentences also conflicts with the plain language
of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (a).88 Nowhere does the statute suggest a

81

Id. at 260.
Id. at 307.
83
Id. at 261.
84
See generally United States v. Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2005).
85
Id. at 608.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
10 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) states in relevant part:
82
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particular order in which the factors should be considered, much less a
mandate that the Guidelines be considered first.89 The Seventh
Circuit’s directive to only consider the statutory factors after
calculating the appropriate Guidelines sentence conflicts with Justice
Scalia’s observation that § 3553(a) itself “provides no order of priority
among all those factors.”90 It seems difficult to imagine that under a
regime of advisory Guidelines, a statutory factor that appears fourth
out of seven should be given a priority absent specific statutory
language.91
By elevating the Guidelines above the other factors listed in §
3553(a), the Seventh Circuit is in danger of deferring to precisely the
kind of “superjudge” Judge Posner warned against in his Booker
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2)
of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular
sentence to be imposed, shall consider--(1) the nature an
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; . . . to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; . . . to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant; and . . . to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for .
. . the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
category of defendant as set for in the guidelines . . . issued by the
Sentencing Commission . . .
(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . issued by the Sentencing
Commission . . .
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
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opinion.92 In justifying the presumption of reasonableness created in
Mykutiuk, Judge Wood relied on the “careful consideration” that has
gone into the Guidelines over the last two decades, but that
consideration is not synonymous with the factors listed in § 3553(a).93
Since their inception, the principal goal of the Guidelines has been
uniformity of sentencing throughout the federal system, not the
consideration of § 3553(a) factors.94When appointed by Congress in
1985, the Sentencing Commission was given the primary task of
decreasing the “unjustifiably wide” disparities that existed within
federal sentencing.95 In doing so, the Commission made certain
concessions and compromises that took a wide range of factors into
consideration, but the Guidelines were not intended to replace the §
3553(a) factors.96
V. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF
REASONABLENESS STANDARD

Just as opera stars often go on singing after being shot,
stabbed, or poisoned, so judicial opinions often survive
what could be fatal blows.97
Four recent cases have demonstrated a surprising inconsistency
in the court’s application of the presumption of reasonableness for
within-the-guidelines sentences.98 In United States v. Jointer, the court
addressed an eighty-seven month sentence given to a defendant
convicted of distribution of crack cocaine and possession with intent to
92

United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 512 (7thCir. 2004).
United States v. Mykutiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
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Booker, 375 F.3d at 516 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
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See United States v. Jointer, 457 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Demaree, 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hankton, 463 F.3d 626 (7th
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distribute crack cocaine.99 In the district court, the sentencing judge
calculated the defendant’s Guideline range, found several
enhancements as well as several subtractions, and found the applicable
Guideline range to be 135 to 168 months.100 The district court then
turned to the § 3553(a) factors and found that that, among other
factors, the need for sentencing consistency across the country
justified the reduction of the 100-1 ratio between crack and powder
cocaine sentences to 20-1.101 The sentence, after calculating the
Guideline range and consulting the § 3553(a) factors was eighty-seven
months.102
Judge Ripple, writing for the court, held that, by using §
3553(a) (6) to reduce the disparity between sentences for powder
cocaine and those for crack, the sentencing judge erred as a matter of
law.103 The court noted that although the Guidelines are advisory, the
court must “respectfully adhere to the 100-1 ratio that Congress has
decided to implement….”104 Despite the fact that the district court
judge followed the precise procedure laid out in Mykytiuk, the court
nevertheless held that the district court’s sentencing discretion did not
include overriding a particular aspect of the Guidelines with any other
factor from § 3553(a).105 Even while limiting the district court’s ability
to implement § 3553(a) factors if they conflict with the Guideline
sentencing range, the court repeatedly stressed that its decision
recognized the advisory nature of the Guidelines.106
Two days after Jointer, the court was faced with the issue of
whether current Guidelines may be applied retroactively without
triggering ex post facto problems in United States v. Demaree.107
99
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Judge Posner wrote for the court and held that because the Guidelines
were no longer mandatory, they could be applied retroactively without
raising ex post facto concerns.108 The court likened the “purely
advisory” Guidelines to a joint resolution of Congress urging heavier
sentences to white-collar criminals, or an increase in prison funding
intended to allow for lengthier sentences.109 None of the analogies
drawn by the court, however, squarely addressed the effect of a
presumption of reasonableness.
The court did acknowledge the argument that a presumption of
reasonableness granted to even an advisory Guideline system could
raise ex post facto issues, but immediately dismissed such concerns
out of hand.110 Judge Posner wrote that the sentencing judge “is not
required—or even permitted—to ‘presume’ that a sentence within the
guidelines range is the correct sentence and if he wants to depart give
a reason why it’s not correct. All he has to do is consider the
guidelines and make sure that the sentence he gives is within the
statutory range and consistent with the sentencing factors listed in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).”111
This remarkable retreat from the formulaic approach the
Seventh Circuit had employed since Mykytiuk did not last for long,
however. Less than a month after Demaree, the court ruled in United
States v. Hankton that “the presumption that a correctly calculated
Guidelines sentence is reasonable not only applies to the appellate
standard of reasonableness review, but also serves as a benchmark for
trial judges in evaluating whether or not a Guidelines sentence is
appropriate.”112
Judge Coffey, writing for the court, made clear that the only
time a sentencing judge even need consider the § 3553(a) factors is

108
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when the defendant provides convincing argument as to why they
should apply.113
Finally, the court in United States v. Gonzalez showed a
marked unwillingness to even consider a within-the-guidelines
sentence as unreasonable.114 In stark contrast to the concession in
Mykytiuk that the “door must be left open” to the possibility of a
sentence falling within the Guidelines being unreasonable, Judge
Posner seems to discount the possibility that anything other than a
departure from the Guidelines justify such a finding.115 According to
Judge Posner, a sentencing judge’s lack of consideration for § 3553(a)
factors was not enough to even raise the question that a within-theGuidelines sentence may be unreasonable.116 Merely citing various §
3553(a) factors that the defendant raised, but were not addressed by
the sentencing court, is insufficient to challenge a sentence as
unreasonable.117 Judge Posner even goes so far as to characterize
appeals of this kind as a “waste [of] time”.118 This approach seems to
conflict with Judge Posner’s own warnings against sentencing judges
using the presumption as a shortcut to avoid addressing more
individualized, and time consuming, sentencing factors.119
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE GUIDELINES WITHIN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are
granted limited to the following Questions: 1) Was the
district court's choice of within-Guidelines sentence
reasonable? 2) In making that determination, is it
consistent with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
113

Id.
United States v. Gonzalez, 462 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2006)
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(2005), to accord a presumption of reasonableness to
within-Guidelines sentences? 3) If so, can that
presumption justify a sentence imposed without an
explicit analysis by the district court of the 18 U.S.C.
§3553(a) factors and any other factors that might justify
a lesser sentence?120
In the time since Booker’s remedy was instituted, Justice
Scalia’s predictions of a “discordant symphony of different standards”
has proven somewhat accurate.121 Currently, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted a presumption of
reasonableness for sentences falling within the Guidelines.122 The
First, Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have rejected the
presumption, but have generally given the Guidelines some level of
deference.123
The Supreme Court has decided to address this Circuit split as
well as other issues left unresolved by Booker in two upcoming cases:
Rita v. United States and Claiborne v. United States.124 In Rita, the
Court will address directly whether a presumption of reasonableness
for within-the-Guidelines sentences is consistent with the Court’s
Booker decision.125 If the Court determines that the presumption is
consistent with Booker, it will go on to determine if that presumption
is enough to justify a sentence without an explicit analysis of the §
120
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3553(a) factors that may merit a different sentence.126 The current
makeup of the Court suggests that whatever the specific outcome, a
modification of Booker’s remedy may be likely. Only Justices Breyer,
Kennedy, and Ginsburg remain of Booker’s remedial majority, while
all four dissenting Justices remain.
The Seventh Circuit has not been unresponsive to the Supreme
Court’s recent actions.127 In United States v. Gama-Gonzales, Judge
Easterbrook offered an opinion meant perhaps as both a summation
and a defense of the Seventh Circuit’s position.128 He explained in the
court’s opinion that “[t]o say that a sentence within the range is
presumptively is reasonable is not to say that district judges ought to
impose sentences within the range. It is only to say that, if the district
judge does use the Guidelines, then the sentence is unlikely to be
problematic.”129 Using an interesting logic, Judge Easterbrook argued
that by granting the presumption, the Seventh Circuit is merely using
the increased sentencing discretion granted by Booker.130 “One
permissible use of discretion[,]” according to Judge Easterbrook, “is to
start with the Guidelines' framework, which is designed to curtail
unjustified disparity in sentences--for avoiding unjustified disparity is
one of the statutory objectives.”131
Gama-Gonzales’ most notable defense of the Seventh Circuit’s
approach comes from Judge Easterbrook’s minimization of the
presumption’s effect.132 Distilling the Seventh Circuit’s position, he
wrote that “[w]hen saying that sentences within the Guidelines are
presumptively reasonable, we mean no more than the modest
proposition that district judges generally possess the discretion under §
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3553(a) and Booker to follow the Guidelines, if they so choose,
without acting un-reasonably.”133
CONCLUSION
Despite the Seventh Circuit’s assurances of the presumption’s
innocuous nature, Judge Easterbrook’s clarification in Gama-Gonzalez
begs the question: if the presumption is nothing more than a rather
generalized statement of a sentencing judge’s discretionary powers,
why is it necessary at all? The uniformity of sentencing and judicial
economy offered by granting sentences falling within the Guidelines a
presumption of reasonableness are certainly legitimate rewards. Those
rewards, however, also carry the danger that the Guidelines will
become a shelter for sentencing judges wishing to avoid the
complexity of individualized sentencing, and a justification for the
appellate court to evade § 3553(a) factors.
As Judge Posner warned in United States v. Cunningham, “the
temptation to a busy judge to impose the guidelines sentence and be
done with it, without wading into the vague and prolix statutory
factors, cannot be ignored.”134 By adopting the presumption of
reasonableness, the Seventh Circuit has indulged that temptation in a
way that allows the court to continue to extol the advisory nature of
the Guidelines, the vitality of the § 3553(a) factors, and the discretion
of sentencing judges while simultaneously undermining each.

133
134

Id. (emphasis original).
United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005).
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